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What does it mean to have a gender identity?1
Abstract
Claims about gender identity are at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. 
Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept, 
in light of features that trans writers and activists seem to attribute to it: The concept should, ideally,
make good trans people’s claims concerning their own gender identities, the claim that people have 
privileged access to their gender identities and, possibly the claim that we all have a gender identity.
Further, to be helpful with current debates, an account of gender identity should admit that 
misgendering is a form of serious harm, and that it is permissible for states, and maybe other agents,
to require information about people’s gender identities.
I conclude that none of the considered accounts meets these criteria, and suggest that we 
can, and should, pursue the feminist project without it. I also explain why a feminism without 
gender identity does not exclude trans people and how it is possible to account for the specific harm
of misgendering without believing that people have a claim to the recognition of their gender 
identities. In the absence of a satisfactory answer to the question of gender identity, it is more 
productive to evaluate each of the trans people’s claims to inclusion into particular spaces 
separately, based on its individual merits.
1. A leisurely introduction
This is an inquiry into the questions of what it could mean to have a gender identity, and 
whether we need the concept of gender identity in order to address questions that are at the core of a
trans-inclusive feminist project. Debates about gender identities abound: in private discussions, in 
mass-media, in the semi-private space of social media, in courts, and in politics, people make 
substantive claims about their, and others’, gender identities. It became common to attribute gender 
identities to oneself and others, and call people “cisgender” or “transgender”. Cis people, we are 
told, are those whose gender identity matches their sex, and transgender – henceforth “trans” – 
people are those characterised by a mismatch. Many people declare their pronouns as a way of 
indicating their gender identities, and it is increasingly frequent for people to be asked to declare 
their own pronouns. Some institutions require us to indicate our gender identity when we fill in 
forms2. Gender identities are said to have great moral significance: Some philosophers believe that 
failing to recognise a person’s gender identity amounts to significant harm, at least when the person 
in question is trans.3 University gender equality officers sometimes go as far as affirming a human 
1 For helpful discussions and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to Ana Belén Amil, Zsuzsanna 
Chappell, Tyler Doggett, Brian Earp, Pablo Gilabert, Holly Lawford-Smith, James Lenman, Matthew Lister, Colin 
Macleod, Alejandra Mancilla, Martin O’Neill, Eva Maria Parisi, Simon Rippon, Pedro Silva, Laura Valentini and 
Andrew Williams, and audiences in Barcelona, Vienna, Oslo, Leuven, Vermont, Stockholm and Montreal.
2 For instance, the Red Cross, following guidance from The Food and Drug Administration. See: 
https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-blood/how-to-donate/eligibility-requirements/lgbtq-donors.html retrieved on 
the 14th of October 2020. 
3 See, for instance, Katherine Jenkins “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman*” 
Ethics 126(2):394-421, 2016 and Stephanie Kapusta, “Misgendering and Its Moral Contestability,” Hypatia 31(3) 
right to gender identity.4 Then, there are disputes about meta-claims about who has the authority to 
determine gender identities and to decide on the substantive normative issues that are said to hinge 
on who has what gender identity, most prominently access to exclusionary spaces. One of the most 
significant ongoing cultural revolutions consists in establishing what trans people are owed by 
justice; a central, if contested, claim in this context is that each of us is the final authority when it 
comes to establishing our own gender identity. Getting things wrong about “gender identity” in 
these public discussions is not a trivial matter: tribunals debate whether or not what people think 
(and say) about gender identity qualify as philosophical beliefs to be protected by the law, and some
find that they don’t5.
And yet, we seem to lack a clear, and publicly accepted, understanding of gender identity; 
what does it mean, exactly, to have one? This paper is born out of the deep puzzlement at my 
unsuccessful attempts to find an adequate answer to this question. The puzzlement is amplified by 
the ease with which other speakers seem to apply gender identity terms, confidently identifying 
themselves and others as either cis or trans.
Following the advice of a trans philosopher6, I will start from my own biographical 
involvement with the question of gender identity. Growing up, I was told that I was female and that,
in virtue of this fact, I should confirm to a set of norms that govern the life of females, but not the 
lives of male people. I call such norms, here, “gender norms”, as does a large body of literature in 
various disciplines. I am using a very wide sense of “norm”, to include explicit and implicit rules 
and expectations, some of which may unconsciously shape a person’s evaluations, including self-
evaluations. More specifically, I was taught that I should be “feminine”, which was supposed to 
mean many things; I was to observe the norms of femininity in my behaviour, looks, dispositions 
and emotions, and even in my aspirations and ambitions. Of course, the requirement to be feminine 
didn’t dictate everything in any of these respects, partly because it was itself open to some 
interpretation. Apparently, there were different ways to comply with gender norms, and one could 
display various kinds of femininity: reserved, playful, or cheeky; rather emotional or rather distant 
and dignified, etc. All these options were supposedly unified by something like an essence of 
femininity, which nobody could pinpoint, and which remained therefore elusive. Reproaches that I 
wasn’t feminine enough, as well as praise that I was, left me with lots of downstream questions as 
2016.
4 For instance my own university. A document published by its Gender Equality Officer, titled “The Human Right to 
Gender Identity” says that “The Central European University is fully committed to the human right to gender 
identity.”
5 See, for instance, the decision of employment Judge Tayler in Forstater v CGD Europe & ors from the 18th of 
December 2019. See: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e15e7f8e5274a06b555b8b0/
Maya_Forstater__vs_CGD_Europe__Centre_for_Global_Development_and_Masood_Ahmed_-_Judgment.pdf 
retrieved on the 14th of October 2020.
6 Sophie Grace Chappell, in “Le bon Dieu n’est pas comme ça: transgender in theory and in experience”, manuscript.
to what they actually meant. In short, I grew up wondering whether I was feminine enough, wishing
to be so, and deliberating about the sort of femininity that was best for me to cultivate. 
Now I believe that all that mulling over “femininity” was a waste of time: my job was to 
learn how to be a morally decent, resourceful and reasonably happy human being, and none of this 
required acquiring a gender identity, or learning how to be a “woman”. Also, I came to believe that 
questions about “femininity” were not only confusing, but also confused. Of course, some of the 
lessons I’ve been taught as part of cultivating my “femininity” were good (sensitivity and 
expressiveness are virtues) and, as it turned out, suited me. Yet, there was no good reason to be 
encouraged to follow them under the guise of “femininity”. It was also a mistake to fail to equally 
encourage other children to follow them because they were supposed to cultivate their 
“masculinity” instead. And some of the lessons in “masculinity” that I would have gotten, had I 
been a male child, would have been equally good for me, morally and prudentially, and in no 
tension with so-called “feminine” qualities. (This is not to deny that some sexual characteristics, or 
combinations of such characteristics, could encumber the cultivation of some desirable features 
traditionally thought of as “feminine” or “masculine”. If they do, this is only an instance of the 
general fact that basic education must attend to children’s specific abilities and inclinations, rather 
than set different goals for different children, according to aptitude.)
Simone de Beauvoir’s famous slogan that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman”, 
was liberating in this respect. I understood her as saying that to be a woman is to have been socially 
trained in a role – the role constituted by a set of gender norms. I use “woman”, here, by stipulation,
as a gender term, to mean the social role that is fitting to occupy if one has female sexual 
characteristics.7 I understood de Beauvoir’s slogan as voicing a complaint against the socialisation 
of some children as “women”. The complaint is that gender roles are shaped by norms that lack 
justification. I am not implying that all gender norms are necessarily unjustified, although those that
create and allocate gender roles are (more on this in the next section). The slogan helped me make 
sense of gender roles as harmful impositions, and of the wrongfulness of socialising children in 
their demands8. To be a feminist, for me, was to respond to such imposition not by seeking a better 
kind of femininity or masculinity, nor by creating more than two gender roles, but by trying to do 
away with gender roles altogether.
7 In fact, I think that “woman” is sometimes correctly used as a gender term and sometimes as a sex term. In 
everyday language it tends to be employed as a sex term. (See, for instance, Jennifer Saul, “Philosophical Analysis 
and Social Kinds: Gender and Race” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 80: 119-44, 2016.) Yet, 
restricting its use to indicate sexual characteristics would unhelpfully deprive us of a term referring to the gender 
role imposed on people with female sexual characteristics. Some philosophers believe that “woman” and “men” 
should be used as sex terms. See Alex Byrne, “Are women adult human females?”, Philosophical Studies 177: 
3783-3803, 2020. I personally doubt that we have enough reason to decide that either use of “woman” is the proper 
one. In any case, for the present purposes, stipulating a meaning is necessary to avoid confusion.
8 Some readers may find it obvious that it is wrongful to impose harmful and unjustified expectations on a child. I 
elaborate on this in “State neutrality and the dismantling of the gendered division of labour” (in progress).
This ideal requires one to abandon normative expectations about how people should be in 
virtue of their sexual characteristics, and to overcome the internalisation of gender norms, which 
may itself survive belief transformation. Since the norms of femininity and masculinity often 
command behaviours and dispositions that are, as such, desirable (e.g.: “be caring!” “be brave!”), 
doing away with gender roles will hopefully happen by making such norms universal. In a post-
gender world, children will be told that whatever is valuable about conforming to some of the 
norms that are currently gendered – about, say, sensitivity or courage – is good independently from 
one’s sexual characteristics. According to my feminist credo, there is no specific way to be a good 
human being qua female, or qua male.
This credo seems inadequate to make sense of current debates about trans identities. If 
“gender identity” meant “gender role” and nothing more, those of us who are critical of role-
dictating gender norms should welcome the waning of gender identities. We should hope that one 
day there will be no more women and men – only people. And we should hope that all talk about 
“femininity” and “masculinity”, whether “toxic” or reformed, will cease, and be replaced by 
gender-free discussions about which behaviours and dispositions are likely to promote morally and 
prudentially good lives. But it is hard to make sense of debates around attributions of gender 
identities without assuming that “gender identity”, as used in these debates, means something 
different from, or in addition to, “gender roles”. Many trans writers and activists share the belief 
that gender norms are unjustified9, yet this doesn’t prevent them from thinking that gender identities
are worth being affirmed and, presumably, preserved. There must be other senses of “gender 
identity”, then, operational in the claims advanced by trans activists.
While my main aim here is to gain understanding, this inquiry also matters for practical 
purposes: Some of the most divisive current disputes concern rules of inclusion and exclusion of 
trans people in and from spaces that are fully, or partly, segregated: public toilets, changing rooms, 
prisons, sports, and affirmative action in educational and political organisations. Many participants 
to these debates seem to assume that settling the question of who is a woman and who is a man, 
which in turn requires the settling of the question of gender identity, is a first and necessary step 
towards determining who should have access to which spaces. If no satisfactory concept of “gender 
identity” can be found, this assumption leads to dead-ends at best, and to heated linguistic polemics 
at worst.
What concept of “gender identity” could, then, account for the core claims usually advanced
in the trans literature? The following features are those which trans writers and activists themselves 
9 There are exceptions: some believe that while the particular content of existing gender norms is objectionable, 
gender norms as such are not unjustified. For instance, Julia Serano, Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on 
Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, Berkley, CA: Seal Press, 2016. In the next section I return to the issue 
of the justification of gender norms.
seem to deem important. First, the term should vindicate the trans people’s identification of their 
own gender identities; an understanding of “gender identity” which implies that a trans woman is a 
man would be seriously deficient. Second, related, the concept must be such that it allows for 
privileged access to one’s gender identity.  This, I take it, is the best interpretation of the trans 
activists’ claim that self-identification is enough to establish one’s gender identity: the claim is not 
about the content, or definition, of one’s gender identity; proper self-identification in this sense is 
grounded in considerations beyond mere fact declaration. Third, an ideal concept of gender identity 
is such that we all have one. This seems to be a general, although perhaps not universal, assumption
of gender identity talk reflected, for instance, in (official) demands to declare one’s gender identity 
on various forms which provide “woman”, “man” and “other” as options but not, as far as I know, 
“none”. It is also reflected in the widespread attribution of cis identities to people who don’t 
identify as trans, and in requests to declare one’s pronouns. The next set of criteria concern 
normative issues. The concept of gender identity at work in trans debates should sit well with two 
closely related but distinct claims of trans activists: first, that denying a person’s gender identity, or 
misgendering, is a grave harm and, second, that we ought to be treated, and perhaps also seen, as 
belonging to the gender with which we identify. This is a widely endorsed belief amongst trans 
activists and supporters. Katherine Jenkins, for instance, writes that: “Failure to respect the gender 
identifications of trans people is a serious harm, and is conceptually linked to forms of transphobic 
oppression and even violence.”10 The second part of this claim may be an overstatement; here I 
work under the more modest assumption that the concept of “gender identity” should be such that 
people have, on non-instrumental grounds, a claim against others to respect their gender 
identifications. Finally, in order to make sense of trans people’s claim to have their gender identities
publicly recognised, and in order for appeals to gender identity to play a role in settling practical 
debates about rules regulating access to public spaces, it must be permissible for states, and maybe 
other agents, to require information about one’s gender identity.
To specify the meaning of “gender”, the next section redraws the sex-gender distinction in a 
way that should be acceptable even to people who think that “sex” itself is a problematic category; 
it also explains the difference between justified and unjustified gender norms. The third section 
explores six different meanings of “gender identity”. None of them will turn out to satisfy the above
criteria, and hence to support the normative claims of trans activists; I suggest that we eliminate the 
use of this concept, at least from political processes, and explain how to make sense of the wrong of
misgendering without appealing to “gender identity”. The fourth section addresses the worries that 
10 In “Amelioration and Inclusion”, 396. For this claim, Jenkins is also referencing Talia Mae Bettcher, “Evil 
Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion,” Hypatia (22): 43–65, 2007. 
More recently, Elizabeth Barnes advanced the claim that misgendering is a major harm. In “Gender and Gender 
Terms”, Noûs 54(3): 704-30, 2020.
it is unfeasible, or undesirable, to abandon the search for a politically operative meaning of “gender 
identity”, and argues that the feminist project can do without “woman” understood as a gender term.
In the absence of a satisfactory answer to the question of gender identity, it is more productive to 
evaluate each of the practical issues under debate on the basis of its individual merits.
2. Sex, gender and norms
Following a long feminist tradition, I work with the sex-gender distinction. The distinction 
is currently under fire11, yet, for reasons that should become clear below, it is indispensable and it 
can be drawn innocuously.
Sex refers to at least four kinds of characteristics: chromosomes, the sort of gametes that 
one’s body produces, hormonal make-up, and internal and external sexual organs plus, perhaps, 
secondary sexual characteristics. The traditional view is that there are two sexes, female and male. 
On different versions of this view, “sex” is about having a Y chromosome or not, or having gone 
some way down a developmental pathway to producing either large or small gametes, or is a cluster
concept involving combinations of sexual characteristics12; on any of these accounts, a number of 
individuals do not display the typical combination of the above-elements. But because a non-
negligible number of people are, in this sense, intersex, some suggested – although perhaps tongue-
in-cheek13 – that there are as many as five sexes. How many sexes there are will then depend on the 
definition of sex in relation to the different elements listed above. Perhaps the traditional, binary 
definition of “sex” is unhelpful in certain circumstances – maybe we should not always bundle, in 
the single concept, the sexual characteristics that are usually displayed together, if the result is 
singling out some people as outliers. This is consistent with thinking that we need bundling for 
particular purposes, such as medical diagnosis and treatment or data-collection about unfair 
treatment of individuals that traditional views of sex identify as females.14  But in many social 
contexts, where the bundling doesn’t serve any valuable social aim, it may be better to think in 
terms of (combinations of) sexual characteristics than in terms of sexes.
Further, it is now possible to alter some sexual characteristics through hormonal therapy and
surgery. Such alternations, I assume, can be permissible, and some people desire them. Since 
individuals can permissibly change many of their sexual characteristics, the very existence of 
“peaks” is a socially contingent fact. Then, perhaps, we should define each (empirically) possible 
combination of sexual characteristics as a separate sex. Or it may be best to refrain from having the 
category of “sexes” altogether, and instead talk exclusively about sexual characteristics.
11 Mari Mikkola, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2017. 
12 Kathleen Stock, Material Girls. Why Reality Matters for Feminism, London: Fleet, 2021, chapter 2.
13 Anne Fausto-Sterling, “The Five Sexes: Why male and female are not enough” The Sciences 33(2): 20-24, 1993,  
and “The five sexes, revisited”, The Sciences 40(4): 18-23, 2000. 
14 Stock, Material Girls.
There is no need to settle these questions for the present purposes. Whether a person with 
XY chromosomes and whose body naturally produces spermatozoids, but who has high levels of 
oestrogen following hormonal therapy and a vagina following sex-reassignment surgery, is male, 
female or a different sex doesn’t matter here15. What does, however, matter, is the difference 
between, on the one hand, unjustified gender norms and, on the other hand, entitlements, liabilities, 
and duties that are justified partly by appeal to their subject’s possession of sexual characteristics. 
Gender, according to another slogan, is “the social meaning of sex”, that is, the sum of norms that 
govern people’s lives depending on their sexual characteristics. A distinction must be drawn 
between those that are potentially justified and those that aren’t.
Some gender norms are explicitly derived, or easily derivable, from more fundamental 
norms that make no reference to sexual characteristics. For instance, there is a general, if qualified, 
entitlement to preventive health care and therefore people with a cervix should be given regular 
smear tests to prevent life-threatening illnesses. Other norms in this category may instead be about 
special duties – for instance, if you carry a baby to term you acquire duties vis-a-vis the foetus that 
you could not acquire if you didn’t have a uterus and hence could not be pregnant. The duty is 
grounded in a more general principle about liability. A host of norms regulate social interaction, by 
generating special entitlements and duties in virtue of how sexual features place us under the 
incidence of various moral principles. Some such norms, which are part of legislations and 
conventional morality, are justified, and other norms, that are not in operation, might be justifiable. 
The ultimate moral grounds for this type of norms has nothing to do with sexual characteristics, yet,
if gender is the social meaning of sex, they qualify as gender norms.
However, it is not these norms that people usually have in mind then they talk about “gender
norms”, but the other category of gender norms, the unjustified ones on which I elaborate below, 
which I call “sui generis gender norms”. They do two things: sort people out, on the basis of their 
sexual characteristics, in two gender roles – “woman” and “man”; and define the content of these 
roles. Gender roles are comprehensive social roles that define, for their occupants, different virtues 
and vices, social rewards and sanctions, and set expectations about who should perform which kind 
of socially useful work. If we were to eradicate all the sui generis gender norms, there would be no 
need for the concept of “gender”. Instead of calling the remaining (justified) norms “justified 
gender norms”, we could call them, simply, “norms related to sexual characteristics”. Unless 
specified otherwise, all talk of gender norms, from the next section onwards, refers to the 
unjustified kind.
15 For simplicity, I occasionally employ, in this paper, the sex terms “female” and “male” to refer to people who 
display the full cluster of sexual characteristics traditionally associated with femaleness, respectively maleness; but 
this is merely for simplicity.
The sense of “gender” that many feminists want to eliminate doesn’t refer to norms which 
are merely derivative from other moral principles that make no essential reference to sexual 
characteristics. Instead, a tradition that goes back at least to John Stuart Mill and found its most 
powerful expression in the work of Susan Moller Okin, is concerned with gender norms that do 
make essential reference to persons’ sexual characteristics. For this reason, it is apt to call them “sui 
generis gender norms”; they demand different treatment of individuals based on their (perceived) 
male or female sexual characteristics, and entail that there is a particular way of being a good 
female human being, i.e. by conforming to the gender role of womanhood, which is different from 
being a good male human being, i.e. by conforming to the gender role of manhood. Sui generis 
gender norms say, for example, that women should be mostly caring, lacking assertiveness, 
nurturing, capable and willing to put other people’s needs first; some of these norms shape value-
loaded expectations, conscious or not, that, for instance, women lack leadership qualities and public
ambitions, need more protection than men, put more effort into self-grooming than men etc. The 
expectations are value-loaded – and hence not mere empirical generalisations – because failure to 
conform to them attracts criticism. Complementary, these norms demand men to be protective, self-
directed and assertive, good leaders etc. Sui generis gender norms require that our judgement of 
individuals’ virtues and vices be dependent on the social role they occupy and thus making, e.g., 
lack of physical courage more deserving of contempt in men than in women, and expression of 
anger more deserving of contempt in women than in men. The hallmark of sui generis gender 
norms is that they judge the goodness of human beings and their behaviours to depend, in part, of 
their sexual characteristics.
Some of these norms license behaviour that is obviously morally wrong – for instance the 
so-called “toxic masculinity”, permitting men to display unnecessary and disproportionate 
aggressiveness. Others, in contrast, mandate morally praiseworthy behaviour – such as nurturing 
from women or protectiveness from men. And yet others seem to be about morally neutral 
behaviour like standards of propriety and beauty. A common problem to all traditional sui generis 
gender norms is the double standard they embody. As noted above, some people believe that we 
should distinguish between more than two sexes; if we did that, and if we were to also adopt sui 
generis gender norms corresponding to more than two sexes, then the norms would embody a 
multiple standard. We obviously need the sex-gender distinction to make sense of gender norms. We
don’t, however, need a view on the correct number of sexes in order to have reason to oppose sui 
generis norms wholesale, and therefore not to want to multiply gender roles.
For starters, it is hard to see what could justify sui generis gender norms, other than appeals 
to religious authority, or (other) metaphysical beliefs. Such religious and metaphysical traditions 
were, historically, pervasive, and their legacy with respect to gender appears to endure even 
amongst people who reject the comprehensive views themselves. Another, obvious reason to reject 
sui generis gender norms is that they are inegalitarian. Part of the feminist project – in philosophy, 
history, sociology, psychology and economics – has been to uncover the wrongful ways in which 
women have been, historically, made worse off by these norms: Their access to important 
opportunities, their freedom from domination, marginalisation and exploitation, and often their very
agency, safety and life have been compromised by sui generis gender norms. A final reason to reject
them concerns the wrong of unnecessarily stunting individuals’ development. To see how this 
reason differs from the concern with equality, consider the fact that the norms in question also 
unjustifiably detract from men’s wellbeing, to a lesser extent than in the case of women, but not 
trivially so. Sui generis gender norms impose higher pressure on men to provide financially for their
families, higher risk of being sent to courts and jails and to fight (usually unjust) wars, and mean 
lesser access for them to the goods of family life and more generally to the goods of healthy, 
enduring, close relationships. These are serious obstacles to men’s flourishing. That is, sui generis 
gender norms do not always, and therefore not necessarily, generate a unidirectional system of 
oppression of women in the service of men’s interests. The question, then, is what, if anything, 
would be objectionable with a set of reformed sui generis gender norms, assigning people, based on
their sexual characteristics, to social roles whose burdens and rewards are equal, but different. The 
answer, clearly, cannot be that such norms would be inegalitarian. Instead, they would be contrary 
to individuals’ freedom to develop their talents and aspirations, and thus to pursue a good life, 
without arbitrary constraints. Sui generis gender norms limits people’s development for no good 
reason and, as a result, are wasteful of human flourishing.
 A distinction between justified and unjustified gender norms can bring clarity to current 
debates. Some philosophers are unpersuaded that we should be eliminativists with respect to all 
gender norms because they think that sexual differentiation is likely to have some justified 
normative bearing16. The best way to make sense of the attractiveness of this position, I propose, is 
by pointing out the distinction between gender norms derived from principles that make no 
reference to sexual characteristics, and that can therefore be justified, and sui generis gender norms,
that are unjustified. It is the latter alone that are the target of gender abolitionism, which, so 
understood, is difficult to resist.
3. Six attempts to understand “gender identity”
All to often “gender” is used as synonymous to “sex”, and sometimes “gender identity” is 
understood as a person’s inner sense of her sex.  For example, Stonewall, one of the most prominent
UK LGBTQ organisations, defines gender identity as “a person’s innate sense of their own gender, 
16 Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?”, Nous 34(1): 31-55, 
2000, p.39; Julia Serano (2016),
whether male, female or something else, which may or may not correspond to the sex assigned at 
birth”17. The Human Rights Campaign, another large organisation in the US that militates for 
LGBTQ equality, writes, on their webpage, that gender identity is “[o]ne’s innermost concept of self
as male, female, a blend of both or neither – how individuals perceive themselves and what they 
call themselves. One’s gender identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at 
birth”18. Similarly, according to a Canadian health organisation, “[g]ender identity means a person’s 
internal sense of whether they’re male or female, both, or neither.”19 I put such definitions aside, 
because they either conflate facts, i.e. sexual characteristics, with norms, i.e. the social meaning of 
sex, or else depict gender identity as an inner feeling, turning it into a primitive notion, impossible 
to unpack further. Indeed, inasmuch they do the latter, they make appeals to gender identity easy to 
dismiss as mystifying, given that many people lack such a feeling and therefore have no way of 
grasping its meaning20. Possibly, one of the six proposals on which I elaborate below, or hybrid 
meanings that combine several of these, capture the intention behind such definitions in more 
intelligible ways. (The fifth proposal is a particularly good candidate.)
Gender identity1, as  (lack of) conformity with behaviour and dispositions typical of one’s sex
The first two ways of understanding “gender identity” are firmly anchored in sexual 
characteristics and make no direct reference to gender norms. One of them, unpromising yet too 
widespread to ignore, consists in a mere description of one’s behaviours and dispositions in those 
respects in which people with different sexual characteristics (are believed to) behave differently 
and have different dispositions. On this view, being cisgender is to display the typical preferences 
and behaviours of individuals with one’s sexual characteristics. Robin Dembroff calls gender 
identity1 a version of the “externalist” approach to gender identity.21
This view raises many problems. Some feminists are critical of gender identity1 because 
they think it helps perpetuate the assumption that behavioural differences between people with 
different sexual characteristics are non-cultural; they see it as a form of “biological determinism”. 
Perhaps this charge is correct. In any case, gender identity1 lumps together differences that are 
indeed explained by different sexual characteristics and those that are cultural. But this definition is 
not operational: how can we know with any certainty how much of the difference between people 
with different sexual characteristics is due to nurture rather than nature? The epistemic obstacles to 
17 From https://www.stonewall.org.uk/help-advice/faqs-and-glossary/glossary-terms, accessed on the 7th of June 2021.
18 From https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-and-definitions, accessed 
on the 31st of October 2020.
19 From https://myhealth.alberta.ca/Alberta/Pages/gender-ID-expression-LGBTQ.aspx, accessed on the 31st of 
October 2020.
20 See Stock, Material Girls.
21 In “Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as Critical Gender Kind”, Philosophers’ Imprint 20(9) 2020.
answering this question may be principled: as Mill noted22, nobody ever lived in a gender-free 
society. 
Even leaving this confusion aside, gender identity1 is inadequate. Not all trans people 
display the behaviours typical of people with different sexual characteristics. Further, individuals 
cannot have privileged access to their gender identity1. Even more importantly, it is hard to see how
a person’s failure to recognise another person’s gender identity1 can be harmful to the latter, rather 
than merely indicate the former’s ignorance of what is typical behavioural difference between 
different groups of people.
Gender identity2, as (dis)comfort with one’s sexed body
More plausibly, gender identity could refer to the degree to which one is comfortable with 
the way in which one’s body is sexed. Sophie Grace Chappell, a prominent trans philosopher, 
believes that longing for a differently sexed body is at the core of what it means to be trans:
“To be a trans woman, as I understand it and as I’ve experienced it, is to be born with a 
male body, and to have a deep and enduring wish to have a female body instead. It’s not 
about gender at all; at least the most basic level, it’s entirely about biological sex.”23
According to another prominent trans philosopher, Talia Mae Bettcher, gender identity2 is one of 
the two available understandings of being trans, which she calls the “wrong-body” model.24
It is easy to make sense of acceptance of one’s sexed body, or longing for a different one. 
Gender identity2 affords privileged access to one’s own gender identity. It sits well with the view 
that people have a significant interest in bodies that they can accept, such that one’s longing for a 
different body generates reasons for others, for instance, to support trans people with bodily 
transitioning by providing material means and social acceptance. But this view also has 
shortcomings. One is conceptual: it is unclear why this is a good definition of gender identity, rather
than a sexual aspect of one’s identity. The view makes sense of what it is to be transsexual rather 
than transgender. Imagine a world with no gender norms: in this world we would not call our 
feelings of (dis)comfort with our sexed bodies “gendered”. If gender dysphoria is different from 
sexual dysphoria, we need another concept of gender identity. Second, it is too narrow; it cannot 
account for cases of self-identified trans people who feel fine with their sexed bodies and have no 
desire to change them. 
The following four attempts to capture the meaning of “gender identity” make direct 
reference to gender norms.
22 In The Subjection of Women, chapter 1.
23 In Jean Kazez, “Sophie Grace Chappell Talks Sex and Gender”, Philosopher’s Magazine 14th of August 2020.
24 In “Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Trans Oppression and Resistance”, Signs 39(2):383-406, 2014, 383.
Gender identity3: as assigned gender role
On my reading of de Beauvoir, to be a woman means to have been raised with a set of 
norms that govern one’s life in virtue of one’s sexual characteristics. If so, de Beauvoir uses 
“woman” as a gender role, to refer to other people’s expectations that one conforms to gender 
norms.
This sense of “gender identity” is widespread in everyday language and philosophical 
analysis. Mari Mikkola, for instance, describes it, in her reporting of Theodore Bach’s account of 
“woman” like this: “one is a woman because one has the right history: one has undergone the 
ubiquitous ontogenetic process of gender socialization.”25 One of the most philosophically 
influential accounts of “woman”, proposed by Sally Haslanger, is a moralised variation of gender 
identity3. According to Haslanger, to be a woman is to have been systematically subordinated in 
some respects, and targeted for subordination in virtue of one’s “observed or imagined bodily 
features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction”26.
Although widespread and philosophically influential, gender identity3 cannot make sense of 
the distinction between cis and trans nor can it accommodate trans people’s own beliefs about their 
own identities, as Jenkins27, for example, has noted. Many, maybe most, trans people have been 
raised in the set of gender norms meant to apply to individuals with their (native) sexual 
characteristics, and so, a trans woman, for instance, has not been socialised in the norms of 
womanhood. This is a fatal flaw of gender identity3 in light of the desideratum, central to the trans 
movement, of an account that explains why trans women are women in virtue of their gender 
identity. And, obviously, one cannot be the ultimate authority on one’s gender identity3.
Another worry, that applies more generally to conceptions of social identities as social roles,
is that gender identity3 does not refer to what the individuals themselves want, but to what others do
to individuals, or expect from them. A mere description of how others treat you is an odd way to 
understand your (gender) identity.
Gender identity4: as aspirational gender role
One needs, then, an account that resonates with descriptions of gender identity as an 
“innermost concept of self” and as “a person’s internal sense” of who they are, but avoids conflating
sex and gender terms. All of the following attempts account for this subjective aspects by tying 
gender identity to attitudes about norms. 
25 In “Feminist Perspectives”. In Bach’s own formulation, to be a woman one “must have undergone the ontogenetic 
processes through which a historical gender system replicates women.” In “Gender is a Natural Kind with a 
Historical Essence”, Ethics 122: 231–272, 2012, p.271.
26 In “Gender and Race.”
27 In “Amelioration and Inclusion.”
Gender identity4 introduces an element of subjective endorsement. It defines gender identity
as the gender norms that a person wishes that others applied to them, that is, as one’s aspirational 
gender role. Chappell explains that one way of being a trans woman is “to want a woman’s gender 
role”28. Gender identity4 consists in identification with a social role, but maybe also with others 
who occupy that role; one of its attractions is that it makes sense of the importance that trans 
women place on being included in women’s spaces and on other women’s solidarity with them29.
Tis view appears to make sense of many trans people’s testimonies about their gender 
identity – to be a trans woman, for example, is to want to be seen and treated as a woman. If gender 
identity is the same as one’s aspirational gender role, people are always the ultimate judges of their 
own gender identity. Gender identity 4 also makes sense of what is to be cis, namely, to wish to 
occupy the gender role that correspond to one’s sexual characteristics.
This last feature indicates a significant drawback of this understanding of gender identity4. 
Many people lack one: Asked what are the gender norms that I would want to be applied to me, the 
answer is “none”. Moreover, if gender roles shouldn’t exist, there is at least a presumption against 
states and other agents requiring people to declare a gender identity4.
There is an even more important, related, difficulty with gender identity4. It is plausible that 
people can suffer serious harm when others fail to recognise their aspirational gender roles; when 
the desire to occupy a gender role is powerful, its frustration can be harmful. Yet, it is far from clear 
that a person is wronged when others don’t comply with that person’s desire to be treated according 
to a particular gender role. To vindicate such a claim one would need an account of why gender 
roles are legitimate. But if the gender norms, which define gender roles, are unjustified, one cannot 
have a claim-right to a gender identity4. Quite the opposite, we may be under a duty not to treat 
others as either a woman or a man. When such treatment is applied with consent from the person 
who has an aspirational gender role, the duty may not be directed, and the person in question may 
not be wronged by gendered treatment. But consent is insufficient to make the treatment 
permissible, if holding people to particular sets of unjustified gender norms reinforces the norms 
and therefore creates negative externalities. If so, then appeals to gender identity4 cannot explain a 
duty to treat particular individuals according to particular gender norms. Instead, if we are right to 
be critical of gender norms, we have a non-directed duty not to do so. Furthermore, states cannot 
justifiably promote or protect gender identity4.
This doesn’t mean that appeals to gender identity4 cannot vindicate any claims of trans 
people concerning their gendered treatment. It would be myopic to ignore that gender norms are 
salient to most social interactions, and people are, in fact, treated either as women or as men. We 
ought to attend to people’s interest in being protected from the most egregious wrongs that can be 
28 In “Bon Dieu.”
29 Stock believes this is the best understanding of gender identity. In Material Girls.
imposed on them via gender norms. Trans individuals, according to gender identity4, desire to 
occupy a different gender role than the one assigned to them on the basis of their (perceived) sexual 
characteristics. This desire is itself likely to indicate that they are being rendered particularly 
vulnerable by the gender role that society expects them to occupy. If so, the critic may think, 
doesn’t this consideration speak decisively in favour of accommodating their desire to occupy 
particular gender roles (perhaps those that would involve the least harm to them)?
This is a very important consideration indeed. However, I think it falls short from justifying 
a claim to decide oneself which gender role to occupy. Rather, it explains why people whose 
assignment to a gender role makes them particularly vulnerable have a weightier claim than others 
against being assigned to that gender role. This claim is additional to that, shared by all individuals, 
against being assigned a gender role, i.e. a gender identity3. To illustrate, trans women’s desire to 
occupy the gender role of “woman” is not enough to generate in others a duty to treat them 
according to the norms of womanhood, since those norms are objectionable; but it can generate a 
particularly stringent duty in others not to hold them to the norms of manhood. In this sense, trans 
people’s contestation of the gender roles assigned to them by society can be a particularly powerful 
source of social transformation, because, other things equal, they have the strongest claims not to be
held hostage to gender roles on grounds of their unique vulnerability to such roles. This account, I 
think, provides the most plausible interpretation of the thought that misgendering involves 
wronging, where the wronging consists not in the refusal “to acknowledge an intensely felt aspect 
of their identity”30, but, rather, in the imposition of a gender role that is particularly alien to the 
person in case.
Gender identity5: as internalised gender norms
Yet another possibility is that gender identity refers to the gender norms that one has 
internalised, that is, according to which one evaluates oneself. This need not mean that one is also 
endorsing the norm; one can feel ashamed, or proud, of how one is, against one’s better judgement. 
A proponent of this account is Jenkins, who writes that gender identity is about “experiencing a 
norm to be relevant to oneself.”31 It may also be the best interpretation of Bettcher’s account, who 
writes that “[b]y gender identity I mean how one conceives of oneself, or feels oneself to be with 
respect to sex and/or gender categories”32 Usually we internalise the norms that regulate the gender 
role we have been socially assigned, but it may be also possible to internalise gender norms without 
30 As Barnes puts it (2020, 720).
31 In “Toward an Account of Gender Identity”, Ergo 5(27), 2018. She builds on earlier work, where she argues that “S 
has a gender identity of X iff S’s internal ‘map’ is formed to guide someone classed as a member of X gender 
through the social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of Xs as a class.” (Jenkins 2016: 410) 
The map in question is a map of gender norms (in the same, wide sense of “norm” that I use in this paper.)
32 In “Trans 101”, The Philosophy of Sex. Contemporary Readings, Seventh Edition, eds. Raja Halwani, Alan Soble, 
Sarah Hoffman, and Jacob M. Held, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017, p.120.
having been explicitly trained into them. Jenkins mentions Julia Serano’s guilt for entering the boy’s
toilets while she was a school child, in spite of having been raised as a male child and, one assumes,
explicitly instructed to use boy’s toilets.
Gender identity5 can validate trans people’s claims about their own gender identity, and 
makes each individual the ultimate authority on this matter. It also captures the phenomenological 
aspect of “identity”: to internalise a norm is to have made it part of oneself, respond subjectively to 
its pull, and perhaps find it difficult to take distance from it.
It can be harmful to withhold approval of a person having internalised certain norms, or to 
deny that person support in acting according to the norms. But it need not be so. Note that gender 
identity5 refers to internalised gender norms, whether or not they are endorsed by the person who 
has internalised them. And many gender norms, I take it, are such that people feel shame when they 
fail to comply with them, even while disowning the norms themselves. You may, for instance, feel 
ashamed to take a lot of space, even while realising that there is nothing wrong with taking that 
space. In this case, you will find your shame at breaking the norm that you shouldn’t take much 
space as unfitting. More generally, one can notice how gender norms are shaping one’s reactions, 
and regret this fact. In such cases, there is no harm in other people refusing to see one’s 
internalisation of the norms in question as part of who one really is; to the contrary, when they do so
they are more likely rendering a service, by helping one to distance oneself from the norm.
Further, and related, gender identity5 has a major shortcoming when it comes to the 
publicity requirement. It is likely nobody’s business to ask you to make public information about 
which gender norms you internalised, even if you endorse them. But when it comes to norms that 
you have internalised, yet do not endorse, the request to declare them goes against important 
interests of yours – that is, to be silent about aspects of yourself that you regret. Usually we 
internalise gender norms as a result of illegitimate social pressure. Often, we continue to comply 
with them, in spite of our better judgement; they, as it were, turn us in some respects into mere 
puppets. If gender identity refers to the internalisation of such norms, we are much better off 
without one. As in the case of aspirational gender roles, the internalisation of particular gender 
norms can generate special claims, on the side of the person having internalised the norm, against 
pressure to conform with gender roles at odds with the internalised norm.
Gender identity6: as endorsed gender norms
The last attempt to understand gender identity is as gender norms that one endorses, whether
or not one has internalised them – whether or not one reacts with pride when one conforms to them 
and shame when one breaks them. A full elaboration of gender identity6 would take further 
explanation of what it means to endorse a norm: whether, for example, a person endorses a norm 
only if that person attempts to act, at least sometimes, according to the norm in question. If so, 
having the gender identity “woman”, for instance, would require that one tries to play, at least 
occasionally, the gender role of “woman”, and gender identity6 would be, in fact, a subcase of 
gender identity4: a gender role to which one aspires for the particular reason that one endorses the 
norms that define that role. Here I leave this complication aside. 
Dembroff, I think, understands “gender identity” along these lines33. According to them, we 
ought to “recognize a new type of gender kind: critical gender kinds, or kinds whose members 
collectively resist dominant gender ideology”, examples of which are “trans men, trans women, 
abortion rights activists, butch dykes, drag queens, genderqueers, stay-at-home dads, female 
powerlifters, tomboys, polyamorous persons.” In my interpretation of Dembroff, consistent with 
what they say about gender queerness in several places in their article34, gender queer people are 
those who challenge dominant gender norms. The implication is that they endorse non-dominant 
ones.
Some people lack a gender identity6, since thy don’t endorse any gender norms; this is the 
lesser problem with the account. The more serious problem is that, absent justification for (even 
non-traditional) gender norms, gender identity6 is subject to the same objections that apply to 
aspirational and internalised gender roles. Nowhere does Dembroff explain what are the non-
dominant gender norms that one endorses qua gender queer and why are they justified. In some 
places they seem to believe that gender queer people are those who reject traditional gender norms 
and don’t, in fact, endorse any other set of gender norms instead35. But this solution leaves entirely 
unclear how gender queer really can be a gender identity, or that gender queer can be a gender kind.
Rather, being gender queer would mean being devoid of a gender identity6, and hence people who 
are critical of (all?) gender norms would lack a gender identity636.
If only it was possible to justify gender norms, whether dominant or not, gender identity6 
would indeed be a very promising concept. But if no such justification is available, having a gender 
identity6, like aspirational or internalised gender roles, cannot ground claims to recognition or 
requests of disclosure from states or other agents.
33 In “Beyond Binary.”
34 For instance, at page 8: “being genderqueer is not so much about rejecting femininity and masculinity de re, but 
rather rejecting them as concepts that always are appropriate for interpreting an individual's behavior or aesthetic.” 
Further, Dembroff’s proposed understanding of gender queer is “a critical gender kind, such that its members have 
a felt or desired gender categorization that conflicts with the binary assumption, and on this basis enact collective 
existential resistance to the binary assumption.” (p. 20) That is – in my reading – gender queer people reject the 
belief that the only gender roles are “woman” and “man”, because they desire, for themselves, another gender role, 
and resist, through their actions, the assumption that there are only two gender roles. That amounts to saying – 
again in my interpretation – that gender queer people endorse gender norms that are non-traditional.
35 They may endorse the meta-norm that gender norms ought to be rejected, which is not itself a gender norm.
36  Indeed, in one place Dembroff writes that “genderqueer does not present a new set of gender norms: it seeks to 
disrupt existing gender norms” (p. 23) but this is in tension with the repeated talk of “traditional gender norms” and 
with the invitation, extended to their readers at the end of the article, to end “gender categories as we know them.” 
(p. 26)
This concludes my search for a concept of gender identity that can help make sense of the 
trans debates in the requisite way: vindicating trans people’s claims about their identity; making 
individuals the ultimate authority about their gender identity; explaining why it is harmful for 
people not to have their identity recognised; and allowing for the permissibility of requirements to 
make our gender identities public. None of the concepts of gender identity in circulation, examined 
above, is able to do these things sufficiently well.
There may be better ways of understanding “gender identity” – perhaps hybrid concepts 
based on the ones I have considered, although these will risk to inherit the flaws of their 
components. Yet, I cannot think of any; until I become aware of a more promising understanding of 
“gender identity”, I conclude that we should abandon the concept; at the very least, we should 
refrain from appealing to it in public debates.
My position does not entail full eliminativism about gender concepts. “Gender norm”, 
including “internalised gender norm”, is essential to feminist social criticism. “Gender role”, and 
“gender socialisation” are needed to make sense of our dispositions and behaviours and for 
identifying the grounds on which people who have been wronged by gender norms can have special
claims. It is likely that, when people declare a certain gender identity, they in fact speak about 
distinct phenomena such as typical or atypical behaviours, sexual dysphoria or lack thereof, 
assigned or aspirational gender roles, or about internalised or endorsed gender norms. Understood 
like this, claims about gender identity are not meaningless, but merely misleading. The 
eliminativism I propose does not deny that each of us has ultimate authority over how we are 
positioned relative to gender norms and roles. Rather, it points out that, whatever we mean when we
talk about gender identities, we lack a claim to others’ validation of our preference – if any – to be 
treated according to particular gender norms. However, as I explained, eliminativism is compatible 
with thinking that one can suffer a special wrong when others, contrary to one’s wishes, hold one to 
particular gender norms. For this reason, trans people have particularly weighty claims to gender 
neutral treatment.
The quest for a concept of “gender identity” in line with the assumptions and claims of 
current trans debate cannot be satisfied without abandoning the belief that gender norms are 
illegitimate; this belief, I assume, is often shared by trans writers and activists. It is also 
theoretically costlier to abandon than the concept of “gender identity”.
4. Two worries and a proposal
Some readers may find my eliminativist view unacceptable, for it denies that we can appeal 
to the concept of “gender identity” in order to settle – or even make progress with – issues of trans 
people’s entitlements. Others, to the contrary, may welcome my conclusion; they may hold an 
independent (and more general) belief that practical questions about people’s competing 
entitlements, including claims to inclusion, should be decided without appealing to the normative 
relevance of their identities. If so, an eliminativist account of gender identity can make things easier.
Even readers sympathetic to eliminativism may harbour two worries: that it is infeasible to 
abandon the search of a proper understanding of “gender identity” and that, all things considered, it 
is undesirable to do so.
The feasibility worry is that gender is so foundational to our identities that we cannot make 
sense of the social world without it. Charlotte Witt, for instance, argues that it is not feasible to 
purge “gender” from the way in which we see the world, because gender roles unify our social 
identities and are therefore essential to social identities; all other aspects of our social identities, she 
thinks, are subsidiary37. If it is impossible to make sense of the social world without gender roles, 
then we should improve them and, indeed, Witt believes that we should redefine them in non-
oppressive ways. We would also need a better way to allocate individuals to these roles than 
according to sexual characteristics, which is unfairly coercive to trans people. Then, perhaps, we 
need a progressive concept of “gender identity” as a legitimate allocation criterion. I don’t have a 
settled view on the question of whether we can purge social ontology of gender roles, but I offer 
two optimistic thoughts.
One answer to this worry, which is rooted in a feasibility consideration, is that the unifying 
role of gender is far from obvious as a general claim. Rather, it is plausible that there is no unique 
such unifier, and which aspect of our social identity is most salient is context-dependent. Thus, it is 
at least imaginable that Ana, a Russian serf and a woman, is primarily a woman to her fellow 
peasants, a serf to the owners of the land on which she lives, and a Russian to the inhabitants of a 
remote country whose people never saw Russians but spent a great deal of time curiously imagining
them. That is, even if the primary way in which her fellow serfs identify her is “a woman”, it is 
plausible that the most salient thing about Ana in her owners’ eyes is that she is a serf (with 
womanhood and being a Russian merely subsidiary), and that for the inhabitants of the foreign 
country to which she escapes the essential thing about her identity is that she is a Russian (with 
womanhood and serfhood less important). If so, gender roles could, after all, be dispensable. 
Readers who find it hard to imagine that Ana’s gender may fade into background in some contexts 
are invited to consider whether their reaction confuses “gender” with “sexual characteristics”. It 
may, indeed, be very hard to become oblivious to people’s overt sexual characteristics; possibly, 
our receptivity to them is dictated by evolutionary reasons that are difficult, if at all possible, to 
overturn. What could be easier to overturn is our interpretation of these characteristics through the 
37 The Metaphysics of Gender, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
prisms of gender norms. Even if it is impossible to overlook sexual characteristics, it might well be 
possible to purge gender roles from our social ontology.
The second answer is that other identities that some people believed to be essential for 
organising the perception of the social world have faded, or become marginal, with time. For 
instance, about two hundred years ago many Europeans took “nationality” to be a, or the, central 
identity category. Here is Jospeh de Maistre (admittedly, an extravagant character) on nationality:
“Now, there is no such thing as ‘man’ in this world. In my life I have seen Frenchmen, 
Italians, Russians, and so on. I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian. 
But as for man, I declare I’ve never encountered him.”38
Today it is a lot easier to “see” human beings without relying on the category of “nationality”; it is 
indicative that many of us find it hard to understand de Maistre’s difficulty to perceive individuals 
in the absence of their national identity. Possibly the same will be true one day of gender identities.
Second, readers may harbour a desirability worry: namely that, without an account of gender
identity and, hence, without the possibility of giving a satisfactory (to trains aims), and context-
independent, answer to the question of who is a woman and who is a man, feminism is unable to 
solve its boundary problem. “Feminism” is most widely understood as a movement aiming to 
overcome the oppression of women. For this reason, writers as ideologically opposed as Esa Diaz-
Leon and Tomas Bogardus seem to agree that feminists need to settle the woman question39. Could 
eliminativism about “gender identity” be desirable, then? What will become of the feminist project 
without an ability to determine what is a woman?
Against Diaz-Leon and Bogardus, I propose a definition of “feminism” without appeal to 
“woman”. The aims of the feminist project, as I understand it, are: (a) to eliminate unjustified 
gender norms, and (b) to mitigate, or compensate, the disadvantages generated by unjustified gender
norms. Neither the first nor the second aim requires consensus on what or who is a woman.
Two reasons speak in favour of adopting this understanding of the feminist project, in 
addition to its ability to avoid the apparently intractable woman question. For one thing, it is 
logically entailed by the basic normative commitments of feminism. The alternative definition of 
feminist – as resistance to women’s oppression – has to answer the upstream question of who, or 
what, oppresses women. The most plausible answer, I contend, is “gender norms”. Some may want 
to add an intermediary step and say that it is patriarchy that oppresses women. But what is 
38 In Considerations on France, trans. Richard A. Lebrun, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1797/1994, p. 
xxiii.
39 Diaz-Leon write that “it would be impossible for feminists to specify that class of individuals that feminism is 
concerned with, assuming that feminism is concerned with the oppression of women.” In “Woman as a Politically 
Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle”, in Hypatia 31(2): 245-258, 2016. For the same reason, Bogardus thinks
that answering the question of what is a woman is the “demarcation problem” of feminism. In “Some internal 
problems with revisionary gender concepts”, Philosophia 48: 55-75, 2020.
patriarchy, and why is it oppressive? Sooner or later, in order to make sense of their grievance, 
feminists have to talk about gender norms and their justification or lack thereof.
In addition, my proposed understanding of the feminist project is naturally inclusive. 
Assuming that virtually nobody escapes gendered socialisation, virtually everybody is shaped by 
gender norms. Not everybody’s interests are equally set back by these norms, and some people are 
also advantaged by them, perhaps all things considered advantaged. But it is at least conceivable 
that a large majority of people experience net losses. If this last claim can be substantiated – and I 
think it can – then most people have reason to adopt the feminist project as I see it. But even if the 
majority of people who are net losers due to the existence of gender norms is not vast, it most 
certainly includes trans people. A feminism whose main focus of concern is gender norms, rather 
than gender identity, has a place for all these people.
5. Conclusions, some political
Recall de Beauvoir’s pivotal claim that one is not born a woman, but becomes one. On my 
early, liberating reading, it implies that we should strive to stop being women (or men), and be, 
simply, “people”. This might explain why, although a feminist, I was never troubled by the 
inconclusive debates of what is a woman40. The action, it appeared to me, was in the identification, 
and elimination, of objectionable gender norms. To do so, I proposed here, one must first 
distinguish between justified and unjustified gender norms. However, the latter norms are not all 
created equal. Some ought to be eradicated because they prescribe impermissible or at least morally 
objectionable behaviour. Others prescribe morally desirable, or even required, behaviour and they 
are only objectionable inasmuch as they are gendered – that is, upholding a double standard. With 
these norms, the challenge is to de-gender them – to apply them universally – without undermining 
them. Finally, there are gender norms whose content is morally neutral – perhaps norms of 
appearance are like this. These, I think, are the most philosophically interesting, since it could be 
equally desirable to eradicate or universalise them.
Today, much of the action has moved to establishing claims that people, allegedly, have on 
the basis of their gender identity. I argued that none of the concepts of gender identity in circulation 
serves this purpose. There are also some practical conclusions to my inquiry. One has reason to 
meet with principled opposition requests to declare our gender identity or our pronouns, at least 
unless we are given a clear explanation of what they mean. Is the question about how one behaves, 
or how one feels about one’s sexed body? About the norms that others imposed on one, or about 
those according to which one would like to be treated? Is it about internalised norms, or about 
norms that one endorses? None of these questions is obviously apt. But we also have reason, in 
40 Which are at the core of academic debates about the foundations of feminism. See Mikkola “Feminist 
Perspectives.”
relation to others, not to misgender, or use pronouns different from what these others declare, unless
there are overriding reasons to do so. In most cases, the only practical way of doing this will be to 
simply accept the pronouns that people that people ask us to use, since pronouns must be used. 
Alternatively, we could adopt a gender-neutral universal pronoun.
Many debates about “gender identity” have been galvanised by very concrete, and urgent, 
practical issues concerning trans people’s claims to have access to various women’s spaces. 
Resolving these debates falls under the second heading of the feminist project, that of mitigating, or 
compensating, the disadvantages generated by unjustified gender norms. One, trans-inclusive, side 
of the debate hopes that settling the issue of gender identity would also yield a verdict about the 
legitimacy of these claims. The other side of the debate assumes that practical controversies could 
be settled by appeal to a set of reasons, having to do with the historical oppression of females, 
understood as people who display all the sexual characteristics that have been traditionally used to 
define femaleness. Such reasons, on this view, indicate that “woman” is best understood as a sex 
term, and at the same time yield a justification for the exclusion of trans women from women’s 
spaces41.
I disagree with both approaches. I think that we can answer these questions without a 
concept of “gender identity” and without deciding whether “woman” is best understood as a sex or 
as a gender concept. (We obviously need, for these purposes, the concepts of “sexual 
characteristic”, “gender norms” and “gender roles”.) Instead, we need to look at each of the urgent 
practical questions in turn, and judge them in light of the specific arguments that bear on each of 
them. I illustrate this approach briefly, and without committing to any particular line of reasoning. 
For instance, the question of whether trans women ought to be free to compete for political 
parties’ women’s quotas will primarily depend on the justification for the existence of quotas. On 
one view, quotas are justified as a way of levelling the playing field, and the playing field is tilted 
by the fact that gender norms advantage some participants and disadvantage others. If so, and if 
trans women are disadvantaged by gender norms in the competition for political power only insofar 
they present, and are typically classified as, women, there is reason not to open these places to trans 
women who are unlikely to have been classified as such for a sufficiently long period of time. If, 
alternatively, quotas are justified because people who have been trained in the gender role “woman”
have their unique, and valuable, perspective to bring to politics, then trans women should have 
access to these places only if they have been subjected, for sufficiently extended periods of time, to 
the gender role “woman”. Finally, if the justification of quotas is to ensure that there are enough 
role models for women who aspire to become politically active, or, more generally, to ensure that 
the citizenry is not alienated by the lack of women in visible political positions, then it is possible 
41 Stock, Material Girls and Holly Lawford-Smith, Gender Critical Feminism, book manuscript.
that a trans woman who has transitioned fulfils this justificatory condition just as well as any other 
woman.
Another example concerns the division between male and female sports. Assuming that the 
very division is justified, the subsequent question is what justifies it; the answer to this question 
should also indicate the criterion for sorting sports people out in two, or more, groups. Most likely, 
the answer will have to do with the influence of one’s hormonal make-up on one’s physical 
properties such as strength and speed, rather than with one’s gender identity. And, if so, one may 
have to start with a comparison between the average trans women’s bodily abilities and the average 
abilities of people whose hormonal make-up has, over the course of their lives, been dominated by 
oestrogen.
A last example concerns the use of segregated toilets. Perhaps in a world without gender 
there would be no need for such toilets, but let’s assume that in our hyper-gendered one segregated 
toilets are needed to protect women from violence at the hands of men. One of the claims that I 
have advanced above, that trans people have a particularly stringent claim against being imposed 
the gender role that corresponds to their (native) sexual characteristics, indicates that they have a 
particularly stringent claim to the creation of additional, non-segregated toilets. Others may have a 
duty to help trans people to enjoy the full value of their right by using non-segregated toilets 
themselves, at least occasionally. But if adding non-segregated toilets is not a real option, 
considerations of special vulnerability may indicate that trans people ought to be free to use any 
toilets they wish; it may well be that the risk of violence faced by trans women, if they are required 
to use men’s toilets, is higher than the risk that their use of women’s toilets would impose on other 
women.
The arguments sketched above in very rough brushstrokes are merely illustrative, and it is 
possible that each of them has fatal flaws. Their only role is to show how the debate can proceed 
even if participants do not avail themselves of the concept of gender identity.
